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Homeland security remains a house divided. Within the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS), a weak, understaffed system exists to guide and integrate its twenty-
two agencies, leaving them to work at cross-purposes rather than as a unified team. 
The collaborative relationship between DHS and its state and local partners is also in 
urgent need of repair. On an issue-by-issue, month-to-month basis, the effectiveness 
of their cooperation swings from excellent to disastrous. Government efforts to 
impose regulations on the private sector pose still deeper problems for building 
collaboration in homeland security. 
These problems can be solved. Stanford University’s Center for International 
Security and Cooperation (CISAC) convened a forum of government and private 
sector leaders in homeland security to propose specific, practical steps that the next 
administration can take to strengthen collaboration in homeland security. This 
report summarizes their recommendations and proposes a number of structural 
changes within DHS to provide for better integration across agency lines and to help 
overcome the agency “stovepiping” that has plagued DHS since its inception. This 
report also examines how the next administration can restructure DHS to transform 
state and local collaboration into a sustained, department-wide priority.  
Opportunities to strengthen collaboration between government and the private 
sector are especially promising. DHS has developed a new “sector partnership” 
model for collaboration in infrastructure protection that should be applied far more 
broadly. Rather than bringing private companies into the development of industry 
regulations at the back end of the process, when DHS officials had already made key 
decisions, the DHS sector partnership model begins that dialogue early so that 
consensus building proceeds from the outset. The next administration should adapt 
this model to strengthen collaborative planning, not only with the private sector but 
also with states and localities in a sustained and institutionalized way. 
Section one of this report examines why the Bush administration has found it so 
difficult to build unity of effort: that is, coordination and cooperation by the 
disparate partners in homeland security to accomplish mutually agreed objectives.  
Section two summarizes how the Stanford forum participants assessed the current 
level of unity of effort within DHS and proposes additional steps for the next 
administration to pursue. Section three examines lessons learned from the 
Department of Defense (DOD) to strengthen unity of effort in homeland defense and 
security. Section four addresses unity of effort problems and solutions for states and 
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localities. Section five focuses on private sector issues. Section six offers additional 
recommendations to restructure the homeland security system. 
I. WHAT IS UNITY OF EFFORT, AND WHY SHOULD WE WANT IT?  
Participants agreed that a defining feature of the homeland security system is the 
lack of hierarchy between its components. As one participant put it: “Governors 
don’t work for the president, and mayors really, really don’t work for governors.”  
Successful strategies to build unity of effort across levels of government, and 
between government and the private sector, must take this absence of hierarchy into 
account.  It would be especially mistaken to replicate the top-down, command-style 
approach to unity of effort that characterizes the Department of Defense (DOD).  
DOD is strongly hierarchical, in that everyone ultimately reports to the president in 
his capacity as commander in chief. The realm of homeland security is far less 
hierarchical, not only in the independently-elected status of governors and mayors as 
the chief executives within their jurisdictions, but also in the critical role played by 
private companies (which report to their shareholders).  
State and local participants maintained that officials in DHS and elsewhere too 
often assume that unity of effort means states and localities should do as the federal 
government directs. As one participant noted, “Folks inside the Beltway think that 
unity of effort means the Feds get to tell everyone else what to do.” Consensus 
quickly emerged that effective unity of effort will only emerge when the 
“stakeholders” in homeland security – federal, state, local, and private sector – help 
formulate the goals that the stakeholders will jointly pursue and reach consensus on 
the means to achieve them.   
Participants noted that any such inclusive system will inevitably be more 
cumbersome and difficult to manage than a top-down system. One participant 
argued that at the federal level alone, so many departments already contribute to 
homeland security decision-making that the resulting policy process is like “a big 
goulash, a gumbo. There’s nothing clear about it anymore, and everything I do has to 
be a compromise with 1,000 other federal guys.” Integrating states, localities, and 
the private sector more fully than is currently the case will multiply those problems 
of policy coordination. Yet, there was broad consensus that building a more inclusive 
policymaking system is essential to sustain homeland security programs and 
capabilities over the long haul.  Much of the remainder of the forum focused on how 
to restructure the homeland security system accordingly, especially in those realms 
where progress to date has been inadequate – and even retrograde. 
From the outset, however, forum participants also noted that two overarching 
problems impede efforts to achieve unity of effort. First, fundamental disagreement 
persists over the definition of homeland security and the missions it should 
comprise, with destructive effects on institutional integration. Participants noted 
that the 2002 U.S. Homeland Security Strategy defines homeland security 
exclusively in terms of terrorism, and excludes natural hazards preparedness from 
missions encompassed by the term; the October 2007 Homeland Security Strategy 
retains that definition. A number of participants argued that by continuing to define 
homeland security exclusively in terms of terrorism, the new strategy exacerbates the 
difficulties of building unity of effort at federal and state levels. One participant, for 
example, noted that there was a continuing “war” in California between the 
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bureaucracies responsible for emergency management (which includes 
responsibilities for natural hazards) and homeland security. Similar conflicts have 
emerged within DHS in terms of the organizational status of FEMA within the 
department and the relative importance of natural hazards in DHS planning 
scenarios and resource allocation. A number of participants argued that bringing 
natural hazards into the core definition of homeland security will be a prerequisite 
for progress in building unity of effort.  
A second, related problem lies in the priorities that ought to drive homeland 
security.  Drawing on the arguments made by Stephen Flynn in The Edge of Disaster 
and Charles Perrow in The Next Catastrophe, many participants argued that 
homeland security policymakers should focus more heavily on threats apart from 
terrorism, including the risks of industrial accidents and breakdowns in U.S. critical 
infrastructure. Other participants disagreed. Restructuring the policymaking process 
to strengthen unity of effort will not diminish such disagreements over homeland 
security priorities. On the contrary: making the process more inclusive, so that all 
the key partners in homeland security can help determine their shared objectives, 
will bring a more diverse set of perspectives and priorities to bear on U.S. policy than 
is currently the case. Disagreements that are currently resolved (or at least papered 
over) by executive fiat would come out into the open. The benefit of a more inclusive 
system, of course, is that the objectives that do emerge from the process will have 
buy-in from those responsible for implementing the goals. Indeed, given the lack of 
hierarchy in the homeland security system, such buy-in will be essential if the next 
administration hopes to sustain homeland security capabilities for the long haul.  
II. UNITY OF EFFORT IN DHS: PROGRESS AND REMAINING 
CHALLENGES 
Participants concurred that the next administration should do much more to 
integrate DHS’s twenty-two component agencies. A few participants said the 
department had become so dysfunctional, and so destructive to agency functions, 
that it should be dismantled. Many others argued that breaking up DHS would 
create so much “organizational churn” that homeland security operations would be 
damaged for years to come. Nevertheless, participants agreed that within the 
existing department framework, significant opportunities exist to strengthen unity of 
effort.  
• Re-establish an Integrated Staff Organization. A number of 
participants criticized current DHS leadership for dismantling the operational 
integration staff (I-Staff) that Secretary Ridge established in December of 
2003. Ridge created a formally structured I-Staff to help him provide unified 
strategic direction to DHS’ twenty-two component agencies, and help break 
down the organizational divides that would otherwise persist between them. 
Rather than have each agency report in a “stovepiped” fashion to the 
secretary, with each developing its own budgetary and programmatic 
proposals in isolation, the I-Staff was supposed to integrate such efforts to 
meet overall department priorities by providing centralized guidance on 
strategic priorities, planning, doctrinal development, and training. No 
STOCKTON AND ROBERTS, CISAC FORUM REPORT 
 
 
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME IV, NO. 2 (JUNE 2008) WWW.HSAJ.ORG  
 
4 
equivalent staff structure exists today, and participants argued that 
stovepiping flourishes as a result.   
A few participants warned that too much integration would be a bad thing, 
however. The integrated staff should give DHS agencies guidance on the 
outcomes to be achieved; agencies should be left with considerable latitude to 
decide how best to accomplish those goals.  
Other participants noted that Congress had gone along with the 
dismantling of Ridge’s integrated staff, and would be likely to resist future 
efforts at integration. Committee oversight of DHS is extraordinarily 
fragmented; the committees that have retained jurisdiction over component 
agencies have a vested interest in preserving the autonomy of those agencies.  
Agency leaders, in turn, have “gone around” DHS leaders to advance their 
own objectives, including helping scuttle progress towards the I-Staff and 
DHS regional office structure that Ridge envisioned. 
• Build a much stronger policy staff. Participants argued that from the 
inception of DHS, the department’s policy planning staff has been 
extraordinarily weak, especially in comparison with departments such as 
DOD. Participants argued that the changes made under DHS’ Second Stage 
Review did little to alter this situation. One consequence for unity of effort is 
that, while there has been what one participant called a “bloatation” of 
strategies by the Homeland Security Council, little doctrine has been built to 
guide and coordinate federal, state, local, and private sector operations. A 
number of participants argued that this lack of doctrine is an especially 
significant shortfall in homeland security to date, and that the next 
administration will need to focus on doctrinal development. To make that 
possible, however, the administration will have to strengthen the doctrine 
development and planning capabilities of DHS. At least as important, the 
administration will also need to help build the planning capabilities of DHS 
partners (local, state, and non-DOD federal) and integrate the department’s 
partners into the planning process in a way that goes far beyond the current 
system. 
• Leverage the non-security functions of DHS agencies more 
effectively. Some participants argued that the current administration has 
erred in attempting to build homeland security capacity by creating terrorism-
specific plans and capabilities from scratch. A more leveraged approach would 
be to take advantage of the non-security expertise of DHS agencies in 
regulatory, safety, and other realms, and apply that expertise to homeland 
security requirements. The opportunities to utilize the Coast Guard in this 
fashion are especially notable, but possibilities exist in other agencies as well.  
A strategy of this kind will help bridge the divide between security and non-
security missions in DHS and provide for better unity of effort across the 
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III. JOINTNESS IN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE: LESSONS 
LEARNED FOR HOMELAND SECURITY 
Forum participants noted that the non-hierarchical political environment that 
characterizes homeland security creates problems for unity of effort entirely different 
from those within DOD. In particular, participants agreed that lessons learned from 
DOD efforts to build “jointness” across service lines would have limited applicably to 
homeland security, since many key organizations in the latter realm report to 
governors and mayors rather than to the president.   
Discussions focused on the problems that the Department of Defense faces in 
contributing to homeland security and partnering with other federal agencies and 
states and localities. Two issues were of special concern to participants: 
• Rethink the split between homeland defense and homeland 
security. A number of participants criticized the Bush Administration for 
building a distinction between homeland defense and homeland security, and 
argued that the resulting split is guaranteed to impede unity of effort between 
DOD (responsible for the former) and DHS (responsible for the latter). One 
participant argued that homeland defense versus homeland security is “a 
distinction without a difference,” and that the next administration should 
eliminate the term homeland defense.  
• Heighten the priority of civil support relative to homeland 
defense. NORTHCOM has tended to treat homeland defense as its top 
priority and civil support as a secondary focus for resourcing and policy 
development. Participants argued that those priorities ought to be reversed, 
and that doing so will facilitate closer integration between the command and 
the federal, state and local entities with which it needs to partner for disaster 
response support operations.  
IV. STATES AND LOCALITIES 
In the summer of 2007, a breakdown was underway in the relationship between 
DHS and states and localities. That breakdown was most evident in the evolution of 
the draft National Response Framework (NRF), which DHS was drafting to replace 
the National Response Plan. Forum participants noted that, in early 2007, DHS 
made a concerted effort to involve state and local representative in the drafting 
process. After providing their input, those representatives were shocked when DHS 
issued a draft report in August 2007 excluding a number of their most important 
recommendations. DHS took those concerns into account in drafting the final NRF 
of January 2008. For the state and local participants in the forum, however, the NRF 
process exemplified the underlying fragility and weakness of their collaborative 
relationship with DHS. 
One participant argued that over the past three years, there has been a “steady 
deterioration” in the links between DHS and its state and local counterpart 
organizations. Another participant said that “DHS has squandered years of goodwill 
with states and localities,” because the department has been “locking them out of 
decision-making. Now, we just look at DHS as a federal teat.” Other participants 
maintained that “the department just pays lip service” to the importance of state and 
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local input on policy issues. The failure of DHS to accept input on the 2007 draft 
National Response Framework was cited as a case in point. As one participant 
summarized the situation (with perhaps a bit of hyperbole), “There is no relationship 
between the federal government and states and localities.”  
Participants from the federal government argued that any administration would 
have faced difficulties in achieving the collaborative goals that states and localities 
seek. The sheer number of states and local jurisdictions, and the diversity of 
positions they represent, complicate federal efforts to incorporate their views in 
planning and programming. As one federal participant noted, “It is intrinsically 
difficult to coordinate with a hundred national associations, each state and territory, 
as well as major urban area and other jurisdictions, no matter who is in charge of 
DHS.” 
State and local participants are especially unhappy with the flow of intelligence 
from DHS. The department has become “irrelevant” to states and localities as a 
source of intelligence, because that intelligence lacks timeliness and adds so little 
value to local terrorism prevention efforts. Another participant noted that “the 
stream of intelligence from DHS is useless,” and that FBI-led Joint Terrorism Task 
Forces remained too focused on criminal activity and investigations (versus the 
intelligence gathering and analysis that is critical to terrorism prevention). As a 
result, localities were building their own intelligence systems to compensate for the 
inadequacies of federal intelligence support. 
Proposals to improve unity of effort between federal, state, and local governments 
fell into two categories: changes within DHS and changes at the state and local level 
to lessen their dependence on DHS (and counter the department’s status as “the 
800-pound gorilla,” as one participant characterized it).   
• Drastically alter the criteria for selecting DHS leaders. Participants 
agreed that the next administration should appoint far more senior officials to 
DHS “who are fluent in state and local government” and who are predisposed 
to accept state and local input on policy issues.  
• Re-establish the DHS Office of State and Local Government 
Coordination and Preparedness (OSLGCP). The next administration 
should also make structural changes to reverse the collapse of relations 
between DHS and its state and local partners. A number of participants 
argued that under Governor Ridge, OSLGCP had provided a relatively 
effective means by which states and localities could provide input to senior 
DHS leaders.  Chertoff subsumed that office under DHS’ Grants and Training 
organization, and (according to one participant) “systematically dismantled” 
the coordination activities that the office had previously provided.  An Office 
of State and Local Government Coordination should be reestablished with a 
direct reporting relationship to the secretary of DHS. Reconstituting that 
office, however, would not obviate the need for DHS components to build 
their own collaborative relationships with appropriate state and local 
representatives.  
• Improve the way that states and localities select their 
representatives to provide input. One participant noted that, at present, 
“DHS tries to ‘cherry-pick’ governors, mayors, and emergency managers to 
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say, ‘We agree with what you’re proposing.’” The associations that represent 
states, localities, and other non-federal partners in homeland security need to 
organize themselves to counter such tactics. Federal participants had a 
different reason to support such reorganization: that is, to have states and 
localities attempt to reach consensus at their level, rather than present DHS 
with myriad conflicting positions on homeland security issues.  
• Restructure DHS grants to states and localities. A number of 
participants thought that the current DHS grant system fosters competition 
between localities and is destructive to building unity of effort across 
jurisdictional lines. The grant process should be restructured to facilitate 
regional cooperation, not undermine it. Consensus emerged that grants 
should also place more of an emphasis on building state and local planning 
capacity, rather than emphasizing equipment purchases. Participants also 
expressed support for federal funding of state and local staff positions to 
provide regional cooperation, and for funding to strengthen the Emergency 
Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) system. The latter effort could be 
especially helpful in reducing state and local dependence on the federal 
government in all but the most devastating disasters. Some participants did 
worry that, taken to an extreme, federal support for state and local staffing 
would conflict with the need for states and localities to be responsible for their 
own homeland security operations.   
• Refine risk-based strategies for grant funding. One participant noted 
that in DHS, “I don’t think we do much risk management with grants – we do 
vulnerability management. Awarding a grant isn’t going to lessen the risk of 
an attack or hurricane, but it is going to reduce our vulnerability to those 
threats. We need a more sophisticated appraisal of what we are doing, why we 
are doing it, and what effect we want to accomplish.” Participants debated a 
number of risk-based strategies that the next administration might use to 
guide the allocation of federal preparedness grants. One approach focuses on 
defending against the most catastrophic threats, which include smallpox, 
anthrax, botulinum toxin, nuclear radiation, and pandemic flu. Another 
strategy funds a minimal level of preparedness across the United States and 
allocates funding beyond that level to specific jurisdictions on the basis of risk 
and the mix of potential targets within the jurisdiction. Many participants 
agreed that national response and recovery is best ensured when all regions 
have attained at least a minimum capacity, because areas not affected by a 
disaster can provide a “surge capacity” for other areas in times of disaster.   
Other participants argued that the next administration should rethink the 
core objectives for using grant assistance to build unity of effort. “The need for 
unity in homeland security is now qualitatively different from in the past.  Our 
past conceptions of unity have flowed from our preoccupation with, and deep 
experience in, incident management. We need to move beyond that 
preoccupation. We also need to think more in grant assistance about the 
problem of sustaining capabilities, rather than just building them, and begin 
to ask the question: how much is enough?”  
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V. THE PRIVATE SECTOR 
The discussion of building unity of effort between government and the private sector 
was notable in three respects.  Participants offered new insights into the problems of 
government regulation in the homeland security realm. Participants also shared 
lessons learned from ongoing regulatory initiatives and discussed ways in which 
industry is taking the lead to build collaboration. Most important, the discussion 
raised a number of opportunities for the next administration to apply these lessons 
across a broad range of homeland security challenges.   
The private sector is critical to unity of effort in homeland security, of course, 
because private industry owns so much of U.S. critical infrastructure and possesses 
data critical to terrorism prevention. The potential for conflict between government 
and industry is equally clear: that is, between the public good of homeland security 
and private economic goals. In particular, participants noted industry concerns that 
government-mandated protective measures can make them less competitive in the 
global economy, and that liability issues can pose serious risks unless taken into 
account in regulatory design or statutory protection. Participants also noted that 
there is often an investment gap between what businesses think is cost-effective to 
spend on protection and prevention, and what government officials believe is 
necessary to secure privately-held infrastructure from terrorist attack or exploitation 
as a means to deliver weapons. Some participants argued that the electric power grid 
offers a prime example of where industry has invested far too little in building 
system resilience. Other participants disagreed, highlighting how difficult it will be to 
reach consensus on the appropriate level of security-oriented investment in 
particular infrastructure sectors, and on the need for government to either require 
greater investment by the private sector or use government funds to underwrite such 
efforts.  
Protective measures can occasionally help an industry’s bottom line. For example, 
the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) persuaded airlines that installing 
security cameras in baggage handling areas would pay for itself by reducing theft.  
Private economic interests can also reinforce private sector incentives to strengthen 
homeland security. One participant noted that the Boeing Company had strong 
incentives to perform effectively in executing its baggage screening contract for TSA 
because if that screening system broke down, “Boeing’s industry customers would rip 
it apart.” Private sector efforts to ensure continuation of operations (COOP) provide 
another realm in which industry incentives will often coincide with homeland 
security goals.  In other cases, however, Congress and/or DHS will push to impose 
regulations on industry that are more costly, or more disruptive to business 
practices, than the industry would prefer.   
Participants discussed three strategies to help secure industry from attack, which 
might be considered “layers in a cake.” The first layer is that of encouraging the 
private sector to do more to secure itself. One critical goal here is “getting the outliers 
in an industry to get in line,” in part by having industries exert peer pressure on the 
companies that are laggards. The second layer consists of helping states and 
localities partner with industry. Until recently, virtually no planning had been done 
between industry and local public safety agencies to prepare for protection and 
prevention activities (and in many cases, not enough for response operations as 
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well).  DHS and its state and local partners were also “starting from scratch” in 
designing grant programs that would build collaborative relationships between those 
partners and the industries in their midst. Ongoing progress in those efforts needs to 
be continued in the next administration. 
The third layer is most problematic: that is, imposing regulations on industry.  
One participant noted that the most serious problems for DHS in the regulatory 
realm lie with those industries that have a long history of being regulated. For those 
industries, “regulation is a bad word,” and they have carried over to DHS the 
adversarial relationship they had with their previous regulators. Especially in the 
safety realm, the attitude of “us versus them” is deeply ingrained. If that attitude is 
transferred to the homeland security realm, “we are doomed.” Many (though not all) 
participants agreed that the next administration should adopt the following 
guidelines to assist regulatory design: 
• Avoid “one size fits all” approaches to regulation. A participant 
noted that “while it’s hard for the Feds to deal with the diversity of states and 
localities, it’s even tighter to deal with the diversity of the private sector.” The 
history of the Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) 
program exemplifies the failure of the early DHS approach to industry 
regulation, in which officials adopted a “one size fits all” approach. The 
history of regulatory efforts in food safety and environmental controls also 
reveals that broad, sector-wide industry regulations will often create 
unnecessary problems for compliance by specific companies and facilities.  
Sector-wide regulations also frequently prompt industry to litigate or lobby 
Congress to kill the rules in question. Regulations should be narrowly targeted 
to take into account variations in industry characteristics while still providing 
for the prevention and protection objectives that government seeks. This 
targeted approach will require that government rely on industry to provide 
information on vulnerabilities and protective opportunities as regulations are 
drafted. The history of U.S. regulatory efforts also suggests that, in developing 
targeted regulations, industry should be asked to provide such information 
early in the drafting process rather than at the back end when key decisions 
have already been made. Environmental and occupational safety regulations 
have become increasingly data-driven; the next administration needs to build 
on the progress DHS has made in applying a similar data-driven approach to 
critical infrastructure protection.  
• Innovative analysis and data collection mechanisms must be 
developed to assess regulatory costs and benefits. A particularly 
important realm for incorporating data into regulatory design lies in 
measuring the benefits and costs of homeland security regulations.  On the 
benefits side of the equation, the uncertainty of whether a terrorist attack on a 
facility will occur – and succeed – complicates the problem of assessing what 
a given regulation will accomplish. That benefits calculus should also be 
extended to take into account the value of protective measures for guarding 
against industrial accidents or natural hazards. It is on the cost side of the 
ledger, however, where the greatest opportunities for progress exit.   
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The interaction between the aviation industry and TSA exemplifies these 
opportunities. In the aftermath of 9/11, industry leaders were concerned that 
government regulations to harden the industry from further attack would kill 
it outright. To head off that risk, industry provided TSA with a cost model of 
the industry that was far more detailed than the government had ever 
possessed. Yet, unless those cost models also included sensitive proprietary 
information on profitability and costs, they would remain inadequate as a 
guide for regulatory efforts. Industry leaders worried that the federal 
government would leak that information. In response, industry partnered 
with TSA to create the U.S. Commercial Aviation partnership, which 
aggregates sensitive proprietary information in a way that protects the 
companies that provide it while still offering a sound basis for regulatory 
design. The next administration should consider applying this partnership 
model to other sectors where inadequate cost modeling continues to impede 
regulatory design.    
• Build on the Sector Partnership model. In implementing the National 
Infrastructure Prevention Plan, DHS has made significant progress in 
institutionalizing a collaborative process by which industry and state and local 
perspectives are brought to bear on regulatory issues. A number of 
participants suggested that the next administration should apply the Sector 
Partnership model to other realms of homeland security. In particular, 
participants noted that rather than bringing stakeholders into the regulatory 
development process at the back end, when DHS officials had already made 
key decisions, the sector partnership model brought industry into the process 
early on so that consensus-building could proceed from the outset. DHS ought 
to follow a similar approach to get state and local buy-in for homeland 
security priorities and programmatic objectives beyond critical infrastructure 
protection. 
The General Accountability Office (GAO) has recently reached the same 
conclusion. On November 1, 2007, the GAO suggested to Congress that 
federal agencies make better use of DHS’ critical infrastructure coordinating 
councils to strengthen preparedness for pandemic flu.1 The GAO found that 
such councils have shown great promise in bringing together multiple 
stakeholders from all levels of government and the private sector to build 
consensus on objectives and functional responsibilities. Further research is 
needed to explore how the lessons learned from infrastructure councils might 
be applied more broadly and – in particular – whether this approach might 
help bridge the widening gaps between DHS and states and localities in 
setting homeland security goals. 
• Consider vulnerability reduction by reducing industry 
concentration. Some participants argued that the private sector has 
economic incentives to concentrate facilities and infrastructure sector 
components that, for the sake of security, should be dispersed. Concentration 
has long been a public safety problem in the chemical industry. In addition, 
however, concentration is accelerating across a range of other infrastructure 
sectors, including agriculture, telecommunications, electric power, and 
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banking. Reducing industry concentration will be costly in many of these 
sectors, as would physically separating vulnerable facilities and transportation 
links from population centers. Yet the security benefits of doing so would be 
immense, and may be difficult to achieve through less radical solutions.   
VI. ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS 
A number of participants argued that the next administration should focus on the 
risk that civil society is becoming disaffected from homeland security. One 
participant argued that the public is becoming increasingly skeptical of the value of 
and need for homeland security programs. Others argued that despite programs such 
as Ready.Gov., the current administration has not effectively engaged the public in 
becoming a partner in homeland security, and in taking responsibility for 
preparedness within their own homes.  
Participants agreed that the fragmented structure of congressional oversight of 
homeland security contributed to the difficulty of achieving unity of effort, especially 
in interagency relations across the federal government. Little progress seems likely 
to occur towards centralization of oversight, however, due to the ability of 
committees to protect their oversight “turf” from proposals for change. Change 
might be more practical in the Homeland Security Council (HSC). A number of 
participants argued that it was destructive to unity of effort to have a separate HSC, 
and that a Council should be combined with the National Security Council to form a 
single, integrated advisory body. Other participants argued that homeland security 
issues would inevitably be given short shrift in any such unified arrangement.  
Participants agreed, however, that the Homeland Security Council needed to avoid 
involvement in operational issues and should focus on the sort of policy coordination 
functions equivalent to those performed by the Council of Economic Advisers. 
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